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INTRODUCTION
Since 2006, US courts have been developing a body of case
law that interprets Chapter 15 of the US Bankruptcy Code
(“Chapter 15”).1 Chapter 15, enacted as part of the Bankruptcy
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005
(BAPCA), grants US courts jurisdiction to recognize a non-US
bankruptcy proceeding and provide effect to that bankruptcy.2
Chapter 15 is based on the Model Law on Cross-Border
Insolvency3 (“Model Law”), promulgated by the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”), which
offers a worldwide framework for coordinating international
insolvencies.4 As the United States’ expression of the Model
Law, Chapter 15 incorporates US policies on cross-border
insolvency.5
Chapter 15 case law is still in its infancy.6 Since its
enactment, less than 200 Chapter 15 cases have been filed.7
1. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1501–32 (2006).
2. Id.
3. Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency of the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law, G.A. Res. 52/158, U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/158 (Jan. 30, 1998)
[hereinafter Model Law].
4. 11 U.S.C. § 1501(a) (stating that the purpose of Chapter 15 is to incorporate
the United Nation Commission on International Trade Law Model Law on CrossBorder Insolvency (“Model Law”) into US law). An international or cross-border
insolvency takes place when a debtor in bankruptcy has assets in more than one
country and, therefore, the laws of two or more countries are implicated in the
insolvency. See CARL FELSENFELD, FELSENFELD ON INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY 1–5
(2003); Gerald I. Lies, Sale of a Business in Cross-Border Insolvency: The United States and
Germany, 10 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 363, 390 (2002). The terms “international
insolvency” and “cross-border insolvency” are used interchangeably throughout this
Comment to refer to a bankruptcy that implicates the laws of more than one nation.
5. See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1532.
6. See, e.g., Selinda A. Melnik, United States, in CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY: A
COMMENTARY ON THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW 265, 324 (Look Chan Ho ed., 2d ed.
2009) (listing fewer than twenty significant Chapter 15 decisions through mid-2009);
Case Law on UNCITRAL Texts, http://www.uncitral.org/clout/searchDocument.
do;jsessionid=1687EC111D1E22A697667C4002159744.cl013 (last visited Aug. 4, 2011)
(showing fewer than thirty-five US cases on this database, which compiles important
case law interpreting enacted versions of the Model Law).
7. See Melnik, supra note 6, at 305–23; cf. Business and Nonbusiness Cases
Commenced by Chapter of the Bankruptcy Code, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/
Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics.aspx (follow “12-month period ending in December” for
relevant charts) (last visited June 2, 2011) (failing to provide statistics for the number
of Chapter 15 cases filed in 2009 and 2010, while providing statistics on the number of
cases filed under other chapters of the US Bankruptcy Code).
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Additionally, it was not until Fogerty v. Petroquest (In re Condor Ins.
Ltd.) (“Condor”) that US courts had the opportunity to rule on
the law governing avoidance actions8 under this provision of the
US Bankruptcy Code.9
In 2007, liquidators of Condor Insurance Limited
(“Condor Insurance”), declared bankruptcy in St. Kitts & Nevis
and thereafter petitioned for recognition of that insolvency in
the United States under Chapter 15.10 Condor Insurance’s
liquidators then commenced an avoidance action in the United
States under St. Kitts & Nevis law to avoid an alleged fraudulent
transfer made by Condor Insurance to its US subsidiary.11
Whether Condor Insurance could commence an avoidance
action via Chapter 15 as opposed to in connection with a
plenary proceeding under Chapter 7 or 11 of the US
Bankruptcy Code was debated before the lower courts.12 In 2010,
the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit issued a final
decision on the matter, ruling that pursuant to § 1521 of
Chapter 15, US courts have authority to permit avoidance
actions via Chapter 15 under the law governing the main
insolvency case.13
As a case of first impression, Condor provides some authority
on how avoidance actions function under Chapter 15.14 Yet,
whether avoidance actions may be brought via Chapter 15 and
whether US courts should unwaveringly defer to non-US
8. Avoidance actions permit a debtor or the representative of a debtor’s estate to
recover assets that were transferred out of the debtor’s estate prior to or during its
insolvency for the benefit of the debtor’s general body of creditors. See infra Part I.A
(defining avoidance actions).
9. See In re Atlas Shipping, 404 B.R. 726, 743 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (explaining
that Condor was the first case to discuss the avoidance carve-out under Chapter 15);
Fogerty v. Petroquest Res., Inc. (In re Condor), 601 F.3d 319 (5th Cir. 2010).
10. See infra Part II.A (discussing Condor’s procedural history).
11. See infra Part II.A.
12. See infra Part II.A.
13. See infra Part II.B (discussing the Fifth Circuit’s holding and rationale).
14. See, e.g., In re Int’l Banking Corp. B.S.C., 439 B.R. 614, 629 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2010) (citing Condor for the proposition that US courts have authority to handle
avoidance actions under non-US law via Chapter 15); Decl. of Stewart Hey as
Representative of Charles Russell, LLP, London, as External Adm’r of Awal Bank,
B.S.C., In Administration, in Supp. of Chapter 11 Pet. and Related Mot. for Relief, In re
Awal Bank, BSC, Nos. 09-15923 (Chapter 15 case) and 10-15518 (Chapter 11 case)
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (showing that following Condor, a non-US representative filed a
plenary proceeding for the purpose of commencing avoidance actions in the United
States).
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avoidance law is debatable.15 Condor presented the unique
circumstance that a non-US insurance company sought
recognition under Chapter 15 and the authority to commence
an avoidance action.16 US law, however, prohibits insurance
companies from filing for insolvency and commencing
avoidance actions under federal law, including under Chapter 7
or 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code.17 Rather than fashion an
exception for insurance companies under Chapter 15 or suggest
that Condor Insurance seek relief under state law, Condor
instead broadly interpreted Chapter 15’s avoidance provisions in
a way that is not consistent with Chapter 15’s legislative history
or with the Model Law.18
As a result, this decision proposes to arm all non-US
insolvency representatives with the right to proceed with an
avoidance action under Chapter 15.19 Chapter 15, though, is
currently not an independent vehicle for avoidance actions.20
Condor also promotes unwavering deference to the avoidance
law governing the main insolvency case.21 Support for this
choice of law rule, however, is also not found in Chapter 15’s
legislative history.22
Going forward, US courts should not rely on Condor’s
interpretation of Chapter 15’s avoidance provisions. To defend
this view and to clarify the avoidance rules under Chapter 15,
15. See infra Part I.E (explaining that § 1523 is the only appropriate vehicle for
avoidance actions under Chapter 15 and showing that pursuant to this section, an
avoidance action brought in connection with a Chapter 15 case may be under US or
non-US avoidance law, and discussing how In re Maxwell, the seminal US case on
choice of law in avoidance actions under the former US law states that courts should
engage in a choice of law analysis before determining whether to apply US or non-US
avoidance law in this context).
16. See infra Part II.A–B (discussing Condor Insurance’s status as an insurer and
explaining that non-US insurance companies do not have access to Chapter 7 or 11).
17. See infra note 124 (explaining that insurance companies cannot file for
bankruptcy under federal law).
18. See infra Part II.B (explaining Condor’s rationale); infra Part III.A (discussing
how Condor misinterpreted the purpose of the avoidance rules under Chapter 15).
19. See infra Part II.B (discussing Condor’s holding).
20. See infra Part I.E (explaining that avoidance actions related to a Chapter 15
case must be commenced through a plenary proceeding under Chapter 7 or 11 of the
US Bankruptcy Code).
21. See infra Part II.B (discussing Condor’s conclusions about when it is
appropriate to apply US or non-US avoidance law).
22. See infra Part I.E (explaining the role of US choice of law principles in
avoidance actions brought in connection with a Chapter 15 case).
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this Comment proceeds in three parts.23 Part I examines
Chapter 15’s origins, providing the context for and history of
Chapter 15’s avoidance rules. Part II explains the Condor case,
including the Fifth Circuit’s rationale and holding. Part III
critiques Condor and concludes that avoidance actions may not
be commenced in connection with a Chapter 15 case outside of
a plenary proceeding under Chapter 7 or 11 of the US
Bankruptcy Code. It explains that US courts should not
unwaveringly defer to non-US avoidance law without engaging
in a choice of law analysis. Finally, it asserts that Condor’s
characterization of Chapter 15 is inconsistent with US policies
and therefore with the spirit of Chapter 15.
I. CHAPTER 15 AVOIDANCE PROVISIONS
Chapter 15’s avoidance provision had many influences in its
drafting stage. Chapter 15 is based on the Model Law, which in
turn was based on the European Union Regulation on
Insolvency Proceedings (“EU Regulation”).24 Since former § 304
of the US Bankruptcy Code (“§ 304”) preceded Chapter 15, it
also remains relevant to Chapter 15’s legislative history.25 Section
304, however, is applicable to Chapter 15 only to the extent that
it does not contradict Chapter 15.26 This is because Chapter 15 is
23. For the sake of simplicity, throughout this Comment, the term “insolvency
representative” will be used to refer to the representative of a debtor’s estate, even
though under US law, the appropriate term may be a “debtor in possession” or a
“trustee,” depending on the circumstances, and under European Union (“EU”) law,
the appropriate term is “administrator.” See Edward J. Janger, Virtual Territoriality, 48
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 401, 414–15 (2010); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Choice of
Avoidance Law in Global Insolvencies, 17 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 499, 502 n.14 (1991).
Moreover, throughout this Comment, the terms “bankruptcy” and “insolvency” will be
used interchangeably, even though they have different meanings in different countries.
The term “bankruptcy” in the United States describes a system for managing general
default of both consumers and corporations, whereas in England, for example, it often
refers only to individuals in bankruptcy while “insolvency” refers to business
bankruptcies. See RICHARD E. BAINES, DOING BUSINESS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
§ 15.01(2) (Matthew Bender ed., 2008) (elaborating on the difference between these
terms); Westbrook, supra at 502 n.14 (asserting that the terms bankruptcy and insolvency
have a different meaning in the United States and in other countries).
24. Council Regulation No. 1346/2000 on Insolvency Proceedings, 2000 O.J.
L 160/1 [hereinafter EU Regulation].
25. See H.R. REP. No. 109-31, pt. 1, at 115 (2005) (explaining that Chapter 15
replaces § 304).
26. See infra note 91 (discussing the limited role of § 304 under Chapter 15).
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a departure from the United States’ previous approach to crossborder insolvency under § 304.27
To understand Chapter 15’s avoidance provision, it is
essential to examine these influences. This Part, therefore,
presents an overview of how the EU Regulation, the Model Law,
and § 304 influenced Chapter 15. Part I.A introduces the
concept of avoidance actions. Part I.B summarizes the theories
of international insolvency, which provide a paradigm for
coordinating international insolvencies. Part I.C examines how
the EU Regulation is structured and, in particular, how it
provides for avoidance relief. Part I.D discusses the purpose of
the Model Law and the avoidance provision therein. Part I.E
explains the United States’ approach towards cross-border
insolvencies, initially under § 304, now under Chapter 15. It
specifically examines Chapter 15 §§ 1521 and 1523, which
address avoidance actions.
A. AVOIDANCE ACTIONS
When an entity files for or is placed in insolvency, the
debtor or an insolvency representative for its estate may
commence an avoidance action to collect assets that the debtor
fraudulently transferred out of its estate, often to place them
beyond the reach of the debtor’s creditors.28 Avoiding such
transfers protects the interests of the debtor’s general body of
creditors by maximizing the assets in the debtor’s estate, placing
creditors in a favorable position to recover on their claims.29
27. See infra Part I.E (discussing § 304 and Chapter 15 and showing that while
§ 304 permitted courts to grant any appropriate relief to non-US insolvencies based on
a few enumerated principles, Chapter 15 is a much more detailed statute that specifies
the procedure for obtaining various forms of insolvency relief).
28. See PHILIP R. WOOD, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY 72 (1995)
(stating that sophisticated bankruptcy laws worldwide permit insolvency representatives
to pursue avoidance actions to undo transfers by the debtor in the twilight period or in
order to prevent fraud); Westbrook, supra note 23, at 504–05 (asserting that most
countries allow avoidance actions to remedy fraud, but also have preference laws, which
allow transfers for less than equivalent value to be avoided).
29. See 8A C.J.S. Bankruptcy § 666 (2011) (explaining that post-petition avoidance
actions prevent debtors from exhausting available resources before creditors have the
opportunity to access them); WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR., NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND
PRACTICE 3D DICTIONARY OF BANKRUPTCY TERMS, § A160 (2011) (stating that prepetition avoidance actions benefit creditors because property is recovered for the
entire estate).
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Thus, at its core, avoidance actions adjust or nullify transfers by
the debtor and subsequently reorder or redistribute the
recovered assets equitably among creditors.30
Avoidance laws often vary by country. As such, each legal
system may provide different reach-back periods in which a
transfer may be recovered, prescribe varying circumstances
under which these actions may be commenced, and include
unique redistribution priorities that reflect a nation’s public
policies.31 When an entity files for or is placed into bankruptcy
in one country and seeks to avoid a transfer in another country,
determining which law should govern the action—the avoidance
law of the primary insolvency case, or the avoidance law of the
place of transfer—presents a choice of law dilemma.32 In
addition, determining where to commence such an avoidance
action is an issue that has to be addressed when structuring a
cross-border insolvency regime.33

30. See Brendan Mockler, Chapter 15 Choice of Avoidance Law in a U.S. Bankruptcy
Court: Is It Really a Choice?, in NORTON ANNUAL SURVEY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW Part I, art.
11 (2009) (asserting that the main goal of an avoidance action is to reallocate a
debtor’s assets according to public policy priorities as laid out by statute); Westbrook,
supra note 23, at 508 (clarifying that avoidance laws restructure the way a debtor’s assets
have been allocated by replacing debtor-creditor actions with actions as prioritized by
statute).
31. For example, St. Kitts and Nevis’ fraudulent transfer laws provide for a reachback period of up to ten years. See Laws of Saint Christopher and Nevis, Ch. 9, ¶ 44. In
contrast, US fraudulent transfer law has a reach-back period of two years. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 548(a)–(b) (2006); see also Mockler, supra note 30, at 3 (explaining that some
countries consider state of mind a relevant factor in making avoidance determinations,
while others do not); Paul J. Omar, The Internationalisation of Insolvency Law: An AngloFrench Comparison, 39 INT’L L. 107, 119 (2005) (stating that France’s avoidance laws
favor employees over other creditors).
32. See U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON INSOLVENCY
LAW, 67, U.N. Sales No. E.05.V.10 (2005) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE GUIDE] (“Where
insolvency proceedings involve parties or assets located in different States, complex
questions may arise as to the law that will apply to questions of validity and effectiveness
of rights in those assets or of other claims; and to the treatment of those assets and of
the rights and claims of those foreign parties in the insolvency proceedings.”);
Westbrook, supra note 23, at 499 (explaining that multinational companies usually
engage in substantial pre-bankruptcy transfers in other countries and that this forces
courts to determine which law should govern).
33. See infra Part I.B (explaining that both choice of forum and law issues are
present in cross-border insolvencies).
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B. INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY PARADIGMS
There are two dominant theories about how to administer
cross-border insolvencies: territorialism and universalism.34
Under territorialism, if a debtor with assets in more than one
country files for insolvency, each country where the debtor’s
assets are located administers those assets pursuant to its local
laws.35 As a result, separate administration, filing, and evaluation
of creditors’ claims take place in multiple jurisdictions and are
governed by varying laws.36 Universalism, on the other hand,
provides that the forum where the insolvency petition is filed,
and its substantive law, will govern the distribution of a debtor’s
assets worldwide.37 This regime treats all similarly situated
creditors equitably and, in its purest form, does not vary the
rights of interested parties based on their physical location.38

34. See, e.g., Edward S. Adams & Jason Fincke, Coordinating Cross-Border
Bankruptcy: How Territorialism Saves Universalism, 15 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 43, 47 (2008)
(stating that universalism and territorialism are the “two main theories” on structuring
cross-border insolvency proceedings); Samuel L. Bufford, Global Venue Controls Are
Coming: A Reply to Professor LoPucki, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 105, 108 (2005) (stating that
universalism and territorialism are the “two dominant theories” on structuring crossborder insolvency proceedings).
35. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A PostUniversalist Approach, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 696, 742 (1999) (explaining that
territorialism describes a system in which each country controls the distribution of
assets within its own territory and allows other countries to do likewise); Westbrook, supra
note 23, at 513 (describing territorialism as the “Grab Rule” because, in response to a
bankruptcy, the courts of each country where a debtor’s property is located “grab” the
property located therein and distribute it according to its local laws).
36. See Bufford, supra note 34, at 114 (explaining that with territorialism each
jurisdiction carries out its own administration, filing, evaluation, and prosecution of the
debtor’s estate); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A Global Solution to Multinational Default, 98
MICH. L. REV. 2276, 2309 (2000) (stating that territorialism is time consuming for
courts and insolvency representatives because creditor claims, estate administration,
and actions occur simultaneously in multiple jurisdiction where the debtor has
property).
37. See LoPucki, supra note 35, at 705 (asserting that universalism is a system in
which a single court handles the administration and distribution of a debtor’s assets
worldwide); Westbrook, supra note 23, at 514 (explaining that under universalism, a
single forum applies a single legal regime to all of the debtor’s affairs worldwide).
38. See Bufford, supra note 34, at 110 (stating that because a single legal regime
governs in universalism, conflicts regarding applicable law, which could vary the rights
of interested parties, are eliminated); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism
in Global Insolvencies: Choice of Law and Choice of Forum, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 457, 466
(1991) (clarifying that universalism “make[s] unequal distributions somewhat less
unequal”).
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Tempered versions of these frameworks, known as modified
universalism and cooperative territorialism, provide less extreme
paradigms
for
conducting
cross-border
insolvencies.
Cooperative territorialism envisions multiple full-scale
insolvencies in countries administering local assets, but also calls
for cooperation through communication by courts
administering a debtor’s assets.39 Modified universalism
conceives of a primary insolvency case with multiple ancillary
cases to assist in implementing the decisions of the main
proceeding.40 The primary difference between these two systems
is that modified universalism accords greater credence to the
laws governing the main insolvency case than does cooperative
territorialism.41 Modified universalism is currently the most
widely accepted, and it is embodied in the EU Regulation and in
the Model Law—the two most comprehensive international
insolvency regimes in effect today.42

39. See Janger, supra note 23, at 406–07 (explaining that courts in different
countries will communicate in cooperative territorialism).
40. See Adams & Fincke, supra note 34, at 48 (asserting that modified
universalism permits a “non-home country” or “non-main” court to open a secondary
insolvency case to supplement the “main” or “home country’s” dominant case);
Bufford, supra note 34, at 112 (stating that modified universalism recognizes that a
main insolvency proceeding may require support through ancillary proceedings in
other countries where the debtor’s assets are located or where local support is
otherwise needed to effectively carry out the objectives of the insolvency).
41. See Janger, supra note 23, at 406–07 (showing that modified universalism calls
for the supremacy of the law where the main proceeding is pending whereas
cooperative territorialism imagines bankruptcies in multiple jurisdictions governed by
varying laws, coordinated only by communication between states); Paul L. Lee, Ancillary
Proceedings under Section 304 and Proposed Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code, 76 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 115, 122–23 (2002) (explaining that in cooperative territorialism courts
usually defers to local law in ancillary bankruptcy proceedings); Jay Lawrence
Westbrook, Creating International Insolvency Law, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 563, 573 (1996)
(stating that cooperative territorialism provides less deference to a main proceeding
than does modified universalism).
42. See Fernando Locatelli, International Trade and Insolvency Law: Is the
UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency an Answer for Brazil? (An Economic
Analysis of its Benefits on International Trade), 14 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 313, 318 (2008)
(asserting that most countries have moved away from territorialism and universalism
towards the more sophisticated “modified universalism”); Janis Sarra, Oversight and
Financing of Cross-Border Business Enterprise Group Insolvency Proceedings, 44 TEX. INT’L
L.J. 547, 553 (2009) (explaining that while most jurisdictions used to be territorial in
their approach to cross-border insolvencies, modified universalism has become more
prevalent, as it represents a compromise to advance cooperation amongst nations).

2011]

WAS CONDOR CORRECT?

359

C. EUROPEAN UNION REGULATION
In 1996, the EU Regulation was promulgated to harmonize
insolvency proceedings among Member States of the European
Union (“EU”).43 Under the EU Regulation, there is a primary
insolvency proceeding, called a main proceeding, and it must be
commenced in the Member State of the debtor’s Center of Main
Interests (“COMI”).44 The COMI is the place where the debtor
regularly administers its affairs in a manner ascertainable to
third parties and is presumptively a debtor’s place of
incorporation.45 To ensure that the insolvency is commenced in
the appropriate jurisdiction, prior to opening proceedings, the
Member State in which relief is being sought must determine
the location of a debtor’s COMI.46 Once a main proceeding is
opened in the appropriate jurisdiction, Member States must
automatically recognize that insolvency and the jurisdiction of
the Member State governing its proceeding.47 Thereafter, all
43. Roland Lechner, Waking from the Jurisdictional Nightmare of Multinational
Default: The European Council Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings, 19 ARIZ. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 975, 978 (2002) (showing that the EU Regulation was first adopted in 1996,
and revised in 2000); see also EU Regulation, supra note 24.
44. See EU Regulation, supra note 24, art. 3(1), at 5 (“The courts of the Member
State within the territory of which the centre of a debtor’s main interests is situated
shall have jurisdiction to open insolvency proceedings.”).
45. Id. pmbl. 13, at 2 (“The [COMI]” should correspond to the place where the
debtor conducts the administration of his interests on a regular basis and is therefore
ascertainable by third parties.”). See generally Re Eurofood IFSC, Ltd., Case C-341/04,
[2006] E.C.R. I-03813 (explaining that a debtor’s COMI is presumptively its place of
incorporation).
46. Cour d’appel [CA] [Court of Appeal], Versailles, Dec. 15, 2005, I.L.Pr. 2006,
32, 681, Besse (Fr.) (“It is correct that the French courts must check that the court of a
Member State has established that it has jurisdiction in its decision to open main
insolvency proceedings; this jurisdiction is dependent upon the centre of main
interests of the company being situated within the jurisdiction of the court hearing the
case.”). Indeed, much litigation has resulted from disputes over where a debtor’s
COMI is located. See, e.g., Eurofood [2006] E.C.R. I-03813, ¶ 24 (addressing whether an
Irish subsidiary of an Italian holding company should commence insolvency
proceedings in Ireland or in Italy and examining the factors that determine a debtor’s
COMI).
47. See Cour d’appel [CA][Court of Appeal], Versailles, Sept. 4, 2003, B.C.C.
2003, 984, Besse (Fr.); Eurofood [2005] E.C.R. I-3813, ¶ 103 (discussing the obligations
of Member States once a main insolvency proceeding has been commenced, the court
notes that “[s]tates may not review the jurisdiction of the court of the State of origin,
but only verify that the judgment emanates from a court of a Contracting State which
claims jurisdiction under Article 3 [comity] and is accepted by numerous
commentators.”). Under the EU Regulation, whether a proceeding was opened in the
appropriate country, i.e., the debtor’s COMI, as a threshold matter, is the only issue
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other EU proceedings relating to that insolvency are
automatically ancillary to the main proceeding, and are called
secondary proceedings.48
Pursuant to Article 4 of the EU Regulation, the law of the
COMI continues to govern fundamental aspects of that entity’s
bankruptcy throughout the EU, including the choice of which
avoidance law will control.49 Recognizing that Member States
make policy choices in fashioning their local avoidance laws, the
EU Regulation calls for displacing the COMI’s law in avoidance
actions, despite the deference afforded to the law of a debtor’s
COMI in Article 4.50
If a non-COMI Member State opens an avoidance action
related to a COMI proceeding, EU Regulation Article 13
controls and provides that the law of the debtor’s COMI will
govern the avoidance action only if the transfer would be
avoidable under both the COMI’s law and the law of the
Member State where the avoidance action is taking place.51
reviewable by the courts of Member States, with the other exception that courts of
Member States may review whether recognizing a “foreign” insolvency is manifestly
contrary to the recognizing Member States’ public policy. See id.
48. EU Regulation, supra note 24, art. 3(3), at 5 (“Where insolvency proceedings
have been opened under paragraph 1 [in a debtor’s COMI], any proceedings opened
subsequently . . . shall be secondary proceedings . . . .”).
49. See id. art. 4(2)(m), at 6 (providing that the law governing the debtor’s COMI
shall determine various forms of relief including “rules relating to the voidness,
voidability or unenforceability of legal acts detrimental to all creditors”); Adam
Gallagher, Center of Main Interest: The EU Insolvency Regulation and Chapter 15, 28-6 AM.
BANKR. INST. J. 44, 45 (2009) (explaining that the law governing the debtor’s COMI
determines, in large part, the parameters of any EU restructuring); Nigel John
Howcroft, Universal vs. Territorial Models for Cross-Border Insolvency: The Theory, The
Practice, and The Reality That Universalism Prevails, 8 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 366, 414–15
(2008) (stating that the law governing a debtor’s COMI determines such matters as
distribution of assets and the rights of debtors and creditors in an EU insolvency).
50. See EU Regulation, supra note 24, art. 13, at 7 (asserting that the COMI’s law
will not govern if proof is provided that “the act is subject to the law of a Member State
other than that of the State of the opening of proceedings, and that law does not allow
any means of challenging that act in the relevant case.”); Miguel Virgos & Etienne
Schmit, Report on the Convention of Insolvency Proceedings, EU Council Doc. 6500/96,
¶ 138, at 89 (May 3, 1996) (explaining that the goal of Article 13 is to displace the
avoidance law of the debtor’s COMI in favor of the law of the forum where the
avoidance action is being commenced and discussing that this rule upholds the
legitimate expectations of creditors or third-parties, and preserves local Member States’
interests).
51. See Ian F. Fletcher, The European Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings:
Choice-of-Law Provisions, 33 TEX. INT’L L.J. 119, 128 (1998) (stating that Article 13
displaces the avoidance law of the debtor’s COMI under certain circumstances); Virgos
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Thus, there are circumstances in an EU insolvency in which the
law of the debtor’s COMI will not govern an avoidance action.52
The EU Regulation accordingly provides jurisdictional mandates
regarding insolvency amongst Member States and resolves
choice of law issues in EU cross-border avoidance actions.53
D. UNCITRAL MODEL LAW
In 1998, UNCITRAL published the Model Law, using the
EU Regulation as its guide.54 Both common and civil law
countries participated in formulating its principles.55 The
purpose of the Model Law is to suggest a method for
streamlining cross-border insolvency among nations.56 It
presents a model law for countries to fashion similar cross& Schmit, supra note 50, ¶¶ 136–37, at 88 (explaining that the only purpose of Article
13 of the EU Regulation is to reject the law of the debtor’s COMI). The COMI’s law,
for example, will not control a contract subject to the laws of another Member State.
See id. Also, the COMI’s law will not trump the laws of another Member State when the
laws of that other Member State would not, for example, permit a certain transfer to be
challenged either under that Member States’ insolvency rules or under its other
applicable laws. See id.
52. Virgos & Schmit, supra note 50, ¶¶ 136–37, at 88 (explaining that the
avoidance law of a debtor’s COMI will not always govern in a cross border insolvency in
the EU).
53. See EU Regulation, supra note 24, pmbl. 23, at 3 (“This Regulation should set
out, for the matters covered by it, uniform rules on conflict of laws which replace,
within their scope of application, national rules of private international law . . . .”).
54. See André J. Berends, The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency: A
Comprehensive Overview, 6 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 309, 320 (1998) (stating that the EU
Regulation was a source of inspiration for the drafters of the Model Law); Robert E.
Cortes et al., Cross-Border Insolvencies and Chapter 15: Recent U.S. Case Law Determining
Whether a Foreign Proceeding Is “Main” or “Nonmain” or Neither, 17 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 5,
Art. 4 (2008) (explaining that the “main” and “nonmain” concepts under Chapter 15
were promoted by the Model Law, which adopted those concepts from the EU
Regulation); see also Model Law, supra note 3.
55. See ABOUT UNCITRAL, ORIGIN, MANDATE, AND COMPOSITION, http://
www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/about/origin.html (last visited June 9, 2011) (stating
that “[t]he Commission is composed of sixty member States elected by the General
Assembly.”); ABOUT UNCITRAL, FAQ, WHAT IS A WORKING GROUP?
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/about/methods_faq.html (last visited June 9,
2011) (“Membership of working groups currently includes all States members of
UNCITRAL.”).
56. See Model Law, supra note 3, pmbl. (stating that the purpose of the Model
Law is to provide a mechanism for handling cross-border insolvencies, to promote
cooperation between nations, provide greater legal certainty for investors, to fairly and
efficiently administer insolvencies, to maximize the debtor’s assets, and to facilitate the
rescue of troubled multinational businesses to protect employment and investment
interests).
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border insolvency laws consistent with the legal system and
policies of the enacting state.57 To date, nineteen countries have
adopted domestic legislation based on its principles.58 Unlike
the EU Regulation, the Model Law does not call upon enacting
nations to suspend their local choice of law rules.59 While
UNCITRAL tried, it failed to adopt uniform choice of law rules,
and as a result, these matters are governed by established rules
and practices of each enacting state.60 The Model Law thus
offers a basic framework for the jurisdictional treatment of crossborder insolvency proceedings by providing a method for
determining the validity of an insolvency proceeding and,
subsequently, the effects of recognition.61
Articles 15 through 17 of the Model Law govern the
procedure for recognizing a foreign insolvency.62 Enacting states
should recognize a foreign insolvency as either a “foreign main
proceeding,” if it is taking place in the debtor’s COMI, or as a
57. See Model Law, supra note 3, pmbl. (explaining that the purpose of the
Model Law is to streamline cross-border insolvencies world-wide); LEGISLATIVE GUIDE,
supra note 32, at 311 (asserting that the Model Law takes into account differing
approaches in national insolvency laws by leaving enacting states to indicate the
meaning of the terms in italics within square brackets.
58. See STATUS: 1997—MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY,
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency/1997Model_
status.html (last visited June 9, 2011) (listing the nineteen countries).
59. See LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 32, at 67–68 (“In the case of such
insolvency proceedings [involving parties or assets located in different States], the
forum State will usually apply its local conflict of laws rules to determine which law is
applicable to the validity and effectiveness of a right or claim and to their treatment in
the insolvency proceedings. The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency
. . . does not include harmonized conflict of laws rules for adoption by enacting States,
thus leaving these matters to established rules and practices.”).
60. See UNCITRAL Rep. of the Working Group on Insolvency Law on the Work
of the Eighteenth Session, 29th Sess., May 28–June 14, 1996, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/419,
¶¶ 46–59, (Dec. 1, 1995) [hereinafter Rep. of the Working Group] (explaining that
UNCITRAL could not agree to impose a system to resolve conflicts of law on enacting
states in its Model Law); LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 32, at 67–68 (stating that the
forum state will usually apply its own conflict of law rules to an international insolvency
to determine which law is applicable to the validity and effectiveness of a right or
claim).
61. See generally Model Law, supra note 3, pmbl. (stating that the purpose of the
Model Law is to provide effective mechanisms for dealing with cases of cross-border
insolvency and setting forth, in Chapter III of the Model Law, the process for
recognizing an insolvency and explaining the effects of that recognition); see also infra
notes 62–73 (discussing the Model Law articles that explain the steps for recognition
and the effects of recognition).
62. See Model Law, supra note 3, arts. 15–17.
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“foreign non-main proceeding,” if it is occurring in a country
where the debtor has an establishment.63 The effects of
recognition of a foreign insolvency are expressed in Articles 20
through 24 of the Model Law.64 Some effects of recognition are
automatic; for example, Article 20 calls for an automatic stay of
adverse activities against the debtor upon recognition of a
foreign main proceeding.65 Some effects are discretionary and
depend on the insolvency rights granted under the domestic law
of the enacting state.66 Article 21 is a discretionary article, stating
that, upon recognition of a foreign proceeding and at the
request of the foreign representative, courts may “grant any
appropriate relief, including . . . relief that may be available to
[insert the title of a person or body administering a reorganization or
liquidation under the law of the enacting State] under the laws of
this State.”67 The italicized portion of this text is to be filled in by
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. art. 17(2).
See id. arts. 20–24.
Id. art. 20(1).
Id. art. 21; GUIDE TO ENACTMENT OF THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON CROSSBORDER INSOLVENCY ¶¶ 154, 159 [hereinafter GUIDE TO ENACTMENT] (explaining that
relief under Article 21 is discretionary and that courts may grant “any type of relief that
is available under the law of the enacting State and needed in the circumstances of the
case” and asserting that with respect to Article 21, “the proviso ‘under the law of this
State’ reflects the principle underlying the Model Law that recognition of a foreign
proceeding does not mean extending the effects of the foreign proceeding as they may
be prescribed by the law of the foreign State. Instead, recognition of a foreign
proceeding entails attaching to the foreign proceeding consequences envisaged by the
law of the enacting State.”).
67. Model Law, supra note 3, art. 21; see UNCITRAL, Rep. of the Working Group,
supra note 60 (showing that although UNCITRAL considered having Article 21 govern
avoidance actions, it decided instead to create a separate article: “While agreeing with
the principle that a foreign representative should be given the right to commence
actions to reverse or render unenforceable legal acts detrimental to creditors
(sometimes referred to as “Paulian actions”), the Working Group considered that it
would be preferable to delete the reference to them in subparagraph (b)(v) [of article
12 which covers the effects of recognition, i.e. the predecessor to Article 21 of the
Model Law]. The numerous issues raised by such actions did not lend themselves to
simple and harmonized solutions within the limited scope of Article 12 [predecessor to
present Model Law Article 21]. The Working Group decided to remove the reference
to those actions from (b)(v) [of Article 12; present Model Law Article 21]. However,
the Working Group decided to consider, at a later stage, the question whether certain
limited aspects concerning those actions could be dealt with in a separate article in the
Model Provisions [present Model Law Article 23]. It was stated that such actions might
present the only possible way for a foreign representative to recover assets. It was stated
that, in any event, the standing of the foreign representative to commence such actions
should be tied to recognition.”); GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, supra note 66, at 62 (showing
that Article 12 was the predecessor to current Model Law Article 21 because at the end
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enacting states, with terms and rules consistent with their
national insolvency laws.68
Other effects of recognition enumerated in the Model Law
merely provide standing to a foreign insolvency representative.69
An example of this is Article 23, which governs avoidance
actions and aims to ensure that a foreign representative is not
deprived of standing to commence an avoidance action simply
because they are foreign.70 Article 23 provides that “[u]pon
recognition of a foreign proceeding, “the foreign representative
has standing to initiate [refer to the types of actions to avoid or
otherwise render ineffective acts detrimental to creditors that are
available in this State to a person or body administering a
reorganization or liquidation].”71 Article 23 does not determine
which law should govern avoidance actions or the circumstances
under which such relief can be commenced72 Instead, these
matters are left to enacting states.73
Since issues regarding choice of law, particularly with
respect to avoidance actions, may arise in the context of crossborder insolvencies, UNCITRAL’s Legislative Guide addresses
these issues in its commentary and recommendations.74 It notes
that some countries leave choice of law determinations
regarding avoidance actions to their local choice of law rules or
may steadfastly apply only the law of a debtor’s COMI.75 Other
of the Guide to Enactment’s discussion on Model Article 21 there is a heading called
Discussion in UNCITRAL and in the Working Group that lists working group document
A/CN.9/433, ¶¶ 127–134 and 138–139).
68. See LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 32, at 311 (asserting that the Model Law
takes into account differing approaches in national insolvency laws by leaving enacting
states to indicate the meaning of the terms in italics within square brackets).
69. Model Law, supra note 3, art. 23 (providing standing to a foreign insolvency
representative to commence an avoidance action).
70. GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, supra note 66, at 167.
71. Model Law, supra note 3, art. 23.
72. See GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, supra note 66, ¶ 166 (stating that Model Law
Article 23 was “drafted narrowly in that it does not create any substantive right
regarding [avoidance actions] and also does not provide any solution involving conflict
of laws”).
73. See supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text (asserting that the Model Law
does not harmonize conflict of laws rules for adoption by enacting states, but rather
leaves that decision to the enacting states’ established rules and practices).
74. See LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 32, at 71.
75. See id. at 67–68, 71 (explaining that when conflicts of law arise some states
will apply their local choice of law rules to resolve while others may decide to apply the
law governing the debtor’s COMI).
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countries apply the law of the place where the transfer
occurred.76 Still other countries might adopt a rule combining
the law of a debtor’s COMI with the law governing the place of
transfer. For example, a country could permit the law governing
the COMI to control only if the transfer is avoidable both under
the COMI’s law and the law where the transfer took place.77
Enacting states have dealt with Article 23, which governs
avoidance actions, in different ways. Some states, such as
Asutrailia and South Africa, drafted Article 23 to provide foreign
insolvency representatives with standing to commence an
avoidance action to the extent such relief is available under their
local laws.78 South Africa’s version of the Model Law provides
that a non-South African insolvency representative may
commence an avoidance action only under South African law.79
Likewise, Australia’s version of the Model Law permits nonAustralian insolvency representatives to avoid transfers solely
according to Australian avoidance laws.80 Japan’s version of the

76. See id. at 71 (asserting that some countries look to the law governing the
transfer to also govern the avoidance action).
77. See id. (explaining that some states determine choice of law based on whether
the transfer is avoidable either under the law of the debtor’s COMI or the law where
the transfer took place, for example, by stipulating that the law of the place of transfer
will govern, unless the law of the debtor’s COMI is stricter than that law).
78. See Cross-Border Insolvency Act 42 of 2000 §§ 21 & 23 (S. Afr.) (“21. (1)
Upon recognition of foreign proceedings, whether main or non-main, where necessary
to protect the assets of the debtor or the interests of the creditors, the court may, at the
request of the foreign representative, grant any appropriate relief, including—(g)
granting any additional relief that may be available to a trustee, liquidator, judicial
manager, curator of an institution, or receiver under the laws of the Republic. . . . 23.
(1) Upon recognition of foreign proceedings, the foreign representative has standing
to initiate any legal action to set aside a disposition that is available to a trustee or
liquidator under the laws of the Republic relating to insolvency.”); Rachel Kelly &
Claire van Zuylen, South Africa, in CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY 229, 242 (2009)
(“Section 23 of the [South African] Cross-Border Insolvency Act enacts Article 23 of
the Model Law and grants the foreign representative the same authority to initiative
legal proceedings to set aside a disposition as is available to a trustee or liquidator
under the South African laws of insolvency.”); Explanatory Memorandum, Cross-Border
Insolvency Bill 2008 (Cth) 12–13 (Austl.) (“For articles 14, 21, 23, 28 and 29 of the
Model Law ‘the law of this State’ is a reference to Commonwealth law. In each case the
relevant laws are the Corporations Act and the Bankruptcy Act, both of which are laws
of the Commonwealth.”).
79. See Cross-Border Insolvency Act § 21 (S. Afr.); Kelly & van Zuylen, supra note
78, at 242.
80. See Cross-Border Insolvency Act 2008 (Cth) § 23 (Austl.); Explanatory
Memorandum, Cross-Border Insolvency Bill 12–13 (Austl.); Rosalind Mason, Australia, in
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Model Law does not enact Model Law Article 23, but states that
a non-Japanese insolvency representative may commence an
insolvency proceeding in Japan to bring an avoidance action.81
These enactments are consistent with the drafters’
understanding of Article 23. The Model Law’s Guide to
Enactment and Legislative Guide explain that the procedural
standing provided by Model Law Article 23 extends only to
rights available to local insolvency representatives.82 Accordingly,
countries implementing the Model Law should adopt Article 23
permission for foreign insolvency representatives to bring an
avoidance action, if such right is available to domestic entities.83
E. US TREATMENT OF CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCIES
The US approach to cross-border insolvency developed
initially through the common-law doctrine of comity, whereby
courts held discretion to assist or recognize non-US bankruptcy
judgments.84 In 1978, this doctrine was codified in § 304 of the
CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY 15, 33 (2009) (explaining that, in Article 23, the governing
law for avoidance actions is that of the Commonwealth).
81. See Shinichiro Abe, Japan, in CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY 139, 146 (explaining
that a provision like Article 23 “is not included in Japan’s insolvency laws—rather, the
foreign representative is given full standing under the same conditions as domestic
creditors”); see generally Gaikoku tosan shori tetsuduki no shonin enjo ni kansuru horitsu
[Law Relating to Recognition and Assistance for Foreign Insolvency Proceedings] Law
No. 129 of 2000 (Japan), translation available at http://www.moj.go.jp/ENGLISH/
information/lrtr-01.html (showing that Japan’s cross-border insolvency law does not have
an avoidance provision like Model Law Article 23).
82. See GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, supra note 66, ¶¶ 165–66 (“The procedural
standing conferred by article 23 extends only to actions that are available to the local
insolvency administrator in the context of an insolvency proceeding” and “[t]he effect
of the provision is that a foreign representative is not prevented from initiating such
actions by the sole fact that the foreign representative is not the insolvency
administrator appointed in the enacting State.”)
83. See supra notes 79–81 and accompanying text (explaining that Australia and
South Africa adopted Article 23 as permitting insolvency representatives to bring
avoidance actions in accordance with Australian and South African laws and that Japan
did not adopt it, but Japanese law explains how a foreign insolvency representative may
avoid a transfer in Japan). Article 23 suggests that an insolvency representative’s right
to commence an avoidance action be consistent with the enacting state’s policies. See
GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, supra note 66, ¶ 166 (explaining that a foreign insolvency
representative should not be deprived of an insolvency right available in that local
jurisdiction simply because they are foreign).
84. See Can. S. Ry. Co. v. Gebhard, 109 U.S. 527, 539 (1883) (holding that
international comity permits deference to the insolvency judgment of a Canadian
court); Mary Elaine Knecht, The “Drapery of Illusion” of Section 304—What Lurks Beneath:
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US Bankruptcy Code.85 That section permitted US courts to
provide ancillary relief to a non-US insolvency representative,
guided primarily by comity, but also consistent with the
following factors: just treatment to claim holders, protection of
US parties, preventing fraudulent transfers, and providing
debtors with a fresh start.86 Courts had broad discretion to
interpret § 304 to decide what assistance, if any, should be
provided to non-US insolvencies.87 However, since US courts
were afforded so much discretion in fashioning relief under
§ 304, case law under this provision of the bankruptcy code
produced inconsistent results.88
In 2006, Congress replaced § 304 with Chapter 15 of the US
Bankruptcy Code (“Chapter 15”).89 The language of Chapter 15

Territoriality in the Judicial Application of Section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code, 13 U. PA. J.
INT’L BUS. L. 287, 312–13 (1992) (explaining that the doctrine of comity preceded
enactment of § 304).
85. See 11 U.S.C. § 304 (2006) (repealed 2005); In re Toga Mfg. Ltd., 28 B.R. 165,
169–70 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983) (explaining that Congress codified the common law
principles of comity in § 304).
86. See 11 U.S.C. § 304 (permitting courts to grant relief based on “what will best
assure an economical and expeditious administration of such estate, consistent with—
(1) just treatment of all holders of claims against or interests in such estate; (2)
protection of claim holders in the United States against prejudice and inconvenience
in the processing of claims in such foreign proceeding; (3) prevention of preferential
or fraudulent dispositions of property of such estate; (4) distribution of proceeds of
such estate substantially in accordance with the order prescribed by this title; (5)
comity; and (6) if appropriate, the provision of an opportunity for a fresh start for the
individual that such foreign proceeding concerns”).
87. See, e.g., Angulo v. Kedzep Ltd., 29 B.R. 417, 418–19 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1983)
(deferring to non-US law and giving effect to a Canadian bankruptcy on comity
grounds because that would “best assure an economical and expeditious
administration of [the] estate”); see generally Toga, 28 B.R. 165 (refusing to defer to
non-US law and explaining that § 304 permitted US courts to make discretionary
decisions under the circumstances of each case—rather than making them bound by
inflexible rules—and thus denying a Canadian company’s legal claim based on
Canadian law in order to protect American interests).
88. See, e.g., Cunard S.S. Co. v. Salen Reefer Servs. AB, 773 F.2d 452, 458 (2d Cir.
1985) (affirming grant of comity to a non-US bankruptcy because that would best serve
US interests); In re Treco, 240 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that differences
between US law and non-US law can warrant rejecting recognition of a non-US
judgment); Knecht, supra note 84, at 288 (discussing In re Koreag, Controle et Revision
S.A., 130 B.R. 705 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991) which determined that US courts should
defer to non-US bankruptcy law and principles to determine whether certain property
was part of the debtor’s estate).
89. See 11 U.S.C. § 1501(a) (2006) (“The purpose of this chapter is to
incorporate the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency so as to provide effective
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tracks that of the Model Law, but also incorporates US policies.90
Due to its similarity to the Model Law, when applying Chapter
15, US courts are guided by application of the Model Law in
other countries and, to a lesser extent, by § 304.91
To obtain recognition under Chapter 15, a non-US
insolvency representative must file a petition with the US
Bankruptcy Court asserting whether recognition is being sought
for a foreign main or foreign non-main proceeding.92 Preceding
recognition, pursuant to § 1519, US courts may provide
preliminary relief to the petitioning party, such as a
discretionary stay under US law.93 Upon recognition, additional
relief arises,94 including the possibility of further discretionary
relief.95 For either automatic or discretionary relief to become
mechanisms for dealing with cases of cross-border insolvency . . . .”); see also supra note
1 (recognizing that this change was passed in Congress in 2006).
90. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 1501, with Model Law, supra note 3 (revealing that
Chapter 15, nearly verbatim, incorporates the language of the Model Law, with
modifications that are specific to US law, such as the exclusion of avoidance relief
under Chapter 15). The numbered provisions of the Model Law even correspond to
the numbered provisions under Chapter 15, in that, for example, Model Law Article 23
is the corresponding provision to 11 U.S.C. § 1523. See Model Law, supra note 3, art. 23;
11 U.S.C. § 1523; see also In re Tri-Cont’l Exch. Ltd., 349 B.R. 627, 632 (Bankr. E.D. Cal.
2006) (“The language of Chapter 15 tracks the Model Law, with adaptations designed
to mesh with United States law.”).
91. See 11 U.S.C. § 1508 (2006) (“In interpreting [Chapter 15], the court shall
consider its international origin, and the need to promote an application of this
chapter that is consistent with the application of similar statutes adopted by foreign
jurisdictions.”). Mention of § 304 case law exists only in the commentary to § 1507, a
provision permitting courts to provide additional assistance to non-US insolvency
representatives subject to other provisions of Chapter 15 and consistent with comity. See
11 U.S.C. § 1507; H.R. REP. No. 109-31, pt. 1, at 119 (2005) (“[J]urisprudence which
developed under § 304 is preserved in the context of new section 1507. On deciding
whether to grant the additional assistance contemplated by section 1507, the court
must consider the same factors specified in former section 304.”); id. at 109 (explaining
that § 1507 permits courts to grant additional relief, but shall not be a basis for denying
or limiting relief otherwise available under Chapter 15).
92. See 11 U.S.C. § 1504 (2006) (“A case under this chapter is commenced by the
filing of a petition for recognition of a foreign proceeding under section 1515.”); 11
U.S.C. § 1515 (“A foreign representative applies to the court for recognition of a
foreign proceeding in which the foreign representative has been appointed by filing a
petition for recognition.”).
93. See 11 U.S.C. § 1519 (2006) (providing that while a petition for recognition is
pending, “where relief is urgently needed to protect the assets of the debtor or the
interests of the creditors, [courts may] grant relief of a provisional nature, including—
(1) staying execution against the debtor’s assets”).
94. See 11 U.S.C. § 1520 (2006).
95. See 11 U.S.C. § 1521 (2006).
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available, however, the court must determine where a debtor’s
COMI exists and, based on that analysis, grant recognition
either as a foreign main or foreign non-main proceeding.96
The breadth of discretionary authority granted to a US
bankruptcy court pursuant to § 1521 is sweeping.97 The court
may grant “any additional relief that may be available . . . except
for relief available under sections 522, 544, 545, 547, 548, 550,
and 724(a).”98 Section 1521 thus allows courts to provide nonUS insolvency representatives with additional relief under US
law.99 The relief excepted from § 1521 governs US avoidance
powers.100 This section’s legislative history explains this exclusion
by reference to the authority of a non-US insolvency
representative’s status to bring avoidance actions under
§ 1523.101
Section 1523 states, in relevant part, that upon recognition
“the foreign representative has standing in a case concerning
the debtor pending under another chapter of this title to initiate
actions under sections 522, 544, 545, 547, 548, 550, 553, and
724(a).”102 This section’s legislative history explains that § 1523
provides a non-US insolvency representative with the option to
96. See In re Bear Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Master Fund,
Ltd., 374 B.R. 122, 126–27 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007), aff’d, 389 B.R. 325, 336 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2008) (stating that recognition must be coded as either main or non-main
under Chapter 15); see, e.g., In re SPhinX Ltd., 371 B.R. 10 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (analyzing
the level of activity of a corporation in the Caribbean, considering third party
expectations, determining that the debtor’s COMI was in the United States and not in
the Caribbean, and denying recognition as a foreign main proceeding, but granting
recognition as a foreign non-main proceeding).
97. See 11 U.S.C. § 1521.
98. Id. (emphasis added). Section 1521 adopts Model Law Article 21 nearly
verbatim except for a modification in (a)(7). Compare id., with Model Law, supra note 3,
art. 21.
99. See 11 U.S.C. § 1521; see also GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, supra note 66, at 61
(asserting that Model Law Article 21 is present to provide foreign insolvency
representatives with additional assistance under the law of the enacting state, which
under Chapter 15 means that courts can provide non-US insolvency representatives
other assistance that would be available to a US bankruptcy trustee).
100. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 522, 544, 545, 547, 548, 550, 724(a) (2006); see also H.R.
REP. No. 109-31, pt. 1, at 115 (2005) (“The exceptions in . . . [§ 1521] relate to avoiding
powers.”).
101. See H.R. REP. No. 109-31, pt. 1, at 115. Model Law Article 21 was not meant
to be an independent vehicle for avoidance actions. See Rep. of the Working Group on
Insolvency Law, supra note 67, ¶ 134 (showing that UNCITRAL determined to adopt a
wholly separate article to govern avoidance relief).
102. 11 U.S.C. § 1523 (emphasis added).
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commence an avoidance action only in a plenary proceeding
under another chapter of the US Bankruptcy Code.103
Furthermore, it states that § 1523 does not “create or imply any
legal rules with respect to the choice of applicable law . . .
[and] courts will determine . . . what national law may be
applicable to such action.”104 Section 1523 therefore only
permits a non-US insolvency representative to commence an
avoidance action through a plenary proceeding under either
Chapter 7 or 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code.105 It also leaves
open the question of which law should apply to such an
action.106 As a result, choice of law rules generally applicable in
federal district courts should control.107
Since § 304 case law provides guidance where Chapter 15
does not, § 304 case law discussing choice of law in avoidance
actions brought in connection with a recognized non-US
insolvency should still be good law.108 The last word on the
subject from the Second Circuit in In re Maxwell explains that
US choice of law principles should guide this determination and
should ultimately turn on the center of gravity of the transfer.109
In sum, while the EU Regulation sets forth both mandatory
jurisdiction and choice of law rules for cross-border avoidance
actions among Member States, the Model Law provides only
jurisdictional guidance with respect to COMI, leaving enacting
states with the task of determining how to address the choice of
103. See H.R. REP. No. 109-31, pt. 1, at 116.
104. See id.
105. Chapter 7 of the US Bankruptcy Code governs the liquidation of a debtor’s
estate. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 96 (9th ed. 2009) (defining Chapter 7 of the US
Bankruptcy Code). Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code governs the reorganization
of a debtor’s affairs. See id. (explaining Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code).
106. See supra notes 103–04 and accompanying text (stating that once an
avoidance action is commenced through Chapter 7 or 11, US courts will determine
“what national law may be applicable to such action”).
107. See generally In re Maxwell Commc’ns Corp., 93 F.3d 1036, 1048, 1053 (2d
Cir. 1996) (noting that US choice of law principles apply to determine which law will
govern an avoidance action in the United States brought in connection with a non-US
insolvency proceeding and explaining that, for example, US choice of law principles
call for applying the law of the jurisdiction having the greatest interest in the avoidance
action).
108. See supra note 91 (discussing the role of § 304 case law under Chapter 15).
109. See Maxwell, 93 F.3d at 1051 (holding that because the debtor’s “center of
gravity” was in England—the debtor and most of its creditors were British, and the debt
was incurred in England,—British rather than US law should govern the avoidance
action).
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law questions that remain.110 With its enactment of § 1523,
Congress restricted all avoidance actions sought in connection
with a Chapter 15 ancillary proceeding, by requiring, first, the
commencement of a plenary proceedings under Chapter 7 or 11
of the US Bankruptcy Code.111 Moreover as Congress did not
codify a choice of law rule for such avoidance actions, § 304 case
law guides this determination.112 As the decisive US authority on
the subject, Maxwell sets forth the choice of law rule for
avoidance actions in this context.113
II. CONDOR
The US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit determined
in Fogerty v. Petroquest (In re Condor Ins. Ltd.) (“Condor”) that a
non-US insolvency representative could commence an
avoidance action via Chapter 15 under non-US avoidance law.114
To reach this decision, Condor employed a textual analysis of
Chapter 15.115 In order to reconcile its holding with § 1523,
which states that all avoidance actions brought in connection
with a Chapter 15 case must be brought through Chapter 7 or
11 of the US Bankruptcy Code, the court explained that § 1523
exists only to provide insolvency representatives with the option
to commence an avoidance action under US law.116 Where the
non-US insolvency representative seeks to commence an
avoidance action under non-US law, Condor instead viewed
§ 1521 as controlling. 117 Since § 1521 does not, on its face,
110. See supra Part I.C–D (discussing the scope of the EU Regulation and the
Model Law).
111. See supra Part I.E (explaining how Chapter 15 adopted Model Law Article 21
and 23 and stating that the legislative history of § 1521 explains that all avoidance
actions brought in connection with a Chapter 15 case are governed by § 1523).
112. See supra notes 103–04 and accompanying text (explaining that § 1523
explicitly leaves open the possibility that a non-US insolvency representative can
commence an avoidance action under either US or non-US law).
113. See supra note 109 (discussing Maxwell’s rule).
114. Fogerty v. Petroquest Res. Inc. (In re Condor Ins. Ltd.), 601 F.3d 319, 323
(5th Cir. 2010) (stating that because § 1521 is silent about avoidance under non-US
law, Condor Insurance can pursue an avoidance action via this section under non-US
avoidance law).
115. See infra Part II.B (explaining Condor’s rationale).
116. See infra note 130 and accompanying text (explaining Condor’s view of
§ 1523).
117. See infra notes 128–130 and accompanying text (explaining Condor’s view of
§ 1521).
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precondition relief under this section on commencement of a
plenary proceeding, the court saw no textual reason to preclude
the representative’s request.118
For the purposes of analyzing this decision, this Part
explains the Condor case. Part II.A sets forth Condor’s factual and
procedural history in the bankruptcy court, the district court,
and in the Fifth Circuit. Part II.B then explains the court’s
rationale, including its textual analysis of Chapter 15.
A. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On November 16, 2007, Condor Insurance declared
bankruptcy in St. Kitts & Nevis.119 Its liquidators subsequently
filed for Chapter 15 recognition in the US Bankruptcy Court for
the District of Mississippi.120 On May 18, 2007, the bankruptcy
court recognized Condor Insurance as a foreign main
proceeding.121 Thereafter, Condor Insurance commenced an
avoidance action under St. Kitts & Nevis law against Condor
Guaranty Trust (“Condor Guaranty”), its US subsidiary, seeking,
among other things, to recover US$313 million in allegedly
fraudulently transferred assets.122
On July 17, 2008, the bankruptcy court dismissed the
avoidance action on the grounds that to bring an avoidance
action, Condor Insurance must first file a plenary proceeding
under Chapter 7 or 11.123 Because Condor Insurance, as an
insurance company, could not file for Chapter 7 or 11, it
appealed the bankruptcy court’s decision.124 On February 9,

118. See 11 U.S.C. § 1521 (2006) (revealing that this section does not require
non-US insolvency representatives to commence a plenary proceeding to obtain
additional relief).
119. See In re Condor, 601 F.3d. at 319.
120. See id. at 320.
121. See id. at 321.
122. See Fogerty v. Petroquest Res., Inc. (In re Condor Ins. Ltd.), 2008 WL
2858943 *1 (Bankr. S.D. Miss., July 17, 2008) aff’d, 411 B.R. 314 (S.D. Miss. 2009), rev’d,
601 F.3d 319 (5th Cir. 2010).
123. See id. at *3.
124. See In re Condor, 601 F.3d at 327 (explaining that non-US insurance
companies do not have access to Chapters 7 and 11); see also 11 U.S.C. § 109 (2006)
(stating that insurance companies may not be debtors under federal bankruptcy law).
Rather, state law governs the reorganization or liquidation of both US and non-US
insurance companies; see, e.g., N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 7406–07 (McKinney 2000) (providing
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2009, the district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s
decision.125 The liquidators of Condor Insurance then appealed
to the Fifth Circuit.126 In its March 17, 2010 decision, the US
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the two lower
court decisions and held that pursuant to § 1521, US courts may
grant avoidance relief via Chapter 15 but only pursuant to the
non-US avoidance law governing in the main insolvency case.127
B. RATIONALE
Employing a textual analysis of Chapter 15, the court found
§ 1521’s silence on avoidance actions under non-US law
significant, and determined that while § 1521 precludes
avoidance under US law, it does not exclude avoidance under
non-US law.128 The court focused on § 1521, which states that US
courts may grant any appropriate relief.129 It found that while
§ 1523 provides a non-US insolvency representative only with the
option to commence an avoidance action under US law by
means of a Chapter 7 or 11 plenary case § 1521 is a vehicle for
avoidance actions under the law governing the debtor’s
COMI.130
“[g]rounds for conservation of assets of a foreign or alien insurer” and “[a]n order of
conservation or ancillary liquidation of a foreign or alien insurer”).
125. Fogerty v. Petroquest Res., Inc. (In re Condor Ins. Ltd.), 411 B.R. 314
(S.D. Miss. 2009), rev’d, 601 F.3d 319 (5th Cir. 2010).
126. See In re Condor, 601 F.3d 319 (5th Cir. 2010).
127. See id.
128. See id. at 324 (invoking the statutory maxim “expressio unius est exclusio
alterius” the court explained that, while the statute [11 U.S.C. § 1521(a)(7)] denies the
non-US representative powers of avoidance created by the US Code absent a filing
under Chapter 7 or 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, it does not necessarily follow that
Congress intended to deny the non-US representative powers of avoidance supplied by
applicable non-US law.).
129. See id. (“The statute provides for ‘any relief’ and excepts only actions under
522, 544, 545, 547, 548, 550, and 724(a) of the Code and includes no other language
suggesting that other relief might be excepted. . . . If Congress wished to bar all
avoidance actions whatever their source, it could have stated so; it did not.”).
130. See id. at 323 (“Where avoidance actions under U.S. law are excluded from a
Chapter 15 ancillary proceeding, section 1523(a) ensures they may be brought in a full
bankruptcy proceeding. And to ensure that a foreign representative enjoys the status of
a trustee under those provisions, section 1523(a) grants standing to a foreign
representative wishing to pursue an avoidance action not under its domestic law but
under U.S. bankruptcy law in a Chapter 7 or 11 proceeding . . . .”); id. at 323–24
(“[S]ection 1523(a) grants no substantive right of avoidance. Rather it lifts a potential
standing roadblock for resort to Chapter 7 or 11.”). The court also stated that § 1523
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In reaching this conclusion, the court took a broad view on
its authority under Chapter 15. It explained that § 1521 permits
avoidance under non-US law because Chapter 15, taken as a
whole, provides courts with authority to assist non-US insolvency
representatives.131 Citing to case law decided under § 304, the
court determined that § 1521 adopts the rule from In re Metzeler,
a district court case holding that non-US insolvency
representatives seeking recognition should only be able to
commence avoidance actions under the non-US law governing
the main insolvency case in an ancillary proceeding under
§ 304.132 Condor defended this decision as pragmatic, because it
avoids the need for expansive plenary proceedings brought
under US law, and, specifically in this case, prevents the United
States from becoming a haven for fraudulent transfers by
insurance companies.133 Finally, the court asserted that this
codifies the rule from a § 304 case called In re Metzeler, which provides that a non-US
insolvency representative may only commence an avoidance action under non-US law
through § 304. See id. at 329 (“Congress essentially made explicit In re Metzeler’s
articulation of the bar on access to avoidance powers created by the U.S. code by
foreign representatives in ancillary proceedings.”).
131. See id. at 325 (“[A]s a catch-all, under section 1507 the court has authority
to provide additional assistance to a foreign representative subject to the restrictions
elsewhere in the Chapter.”); id. (“Though the language does not explicitly address the
use of foreign avoidance law, it suggests a broad reading of the powers granted to the
district court in order to advance the goals of comity to foreign jurisdictions.”).
132. See id. at 328 (citing In re Metzeler, 78 B.R. 674, 677 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987))
(asserting that a non-US insolvency representative may only commence an avoidance
action under non-US law, because, relying on one academic article, this is more
consistent with comity and because the US Bankruptcy Code does not explicitly permit
non-US insolvency representatives to invoke US avoiding powers); see also id. at 328 n.50
(listing several other cases that also rely on Metzeler including: In re Aerovias Nacionales
de Columbia S.A. Avianca, 303 B.R. 1 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003) (discussing where a
debtor may file for insolvency and not discussing avoidance actions, choice of law in a
non-US proceeding seeking recognition, or Metzeler); In re Griffin Trading Co., 270
B.R. 883 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2001) (citing Metzeler only to help define the term “US
Trustee”); Petition of Kojima, 177 B.R. 696, 7032 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1995) (permitting
avoidance under Japanese law after comparing US and Japanese avoidance laws, and
citing to Metzeler for authority to permit such relief); and In re Tarricone, 80 B.R. 21
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987) (dismissing an avoidance action by a non-US insolvency
representative under US law because it was brought too late for recovery and because,
citing to Metzeler, it should have been brought under German law)); see also supra note
130.
133. See In re Condor, 601 F.3d at 327 (“Congress did not intend to restrict the
powers of the U.S. court to apply the law of the country where the main proceeding
pends. Refusing to do so would lend a measure of protection to debtors to hide assets
in the United States out of the reach of the foreign jurisdiction, forcing foreign
representatives to initiate much more expansive proceedings to recover assets

2011]

WAS CONDOR CORRECT?

375

reading of the statute fosters predictability in international
insolvencies.134
Thus, Condor concluded that Condor Insurance’s avoidance
action could proceed under St. Kitts & Nevis law via § 1521. In
so holding, it determined that Chapter 15 is a vehicle for
avoidance actions. It also found that the law of a debtor’s COMI
should govern an avoidance action brought pursuant to § 1521.
III. CRITIQUE OF CONDOR
While the decision provided Condor Insurance with the
relief it sought, it broadly reframed the ability of a non-US
representative to commence avoidance actions following
recognition of a non-US proceeding under Chapter 15.135
Chapter 15 sanctions the commencement of avoidance actions
only in the context of a pending plenary proceeding under
Chapter 7 or 11.136 Moreover, although US courts occasionally
enforce non-US law, they do so only after engaging in a choice
of law analysis that directs application of non-US law.137 Condor
does not condition its conclusion that § 1521 enables non-US
insolvency representatives to commence an avoidance action in
a US court under the law of the debtor’s COMI on such a choice

fraudulently conveyed, the scenario Chapter 15 was designed to prevent. We are not
persuaded that Congress has unwittingly facilitated such tactics—-with foreign
insurance companies, access to Chapters 7 and 11 is otherwise denied.”).
134. See id. (“And this silence [regarding non-US avoidance law] is loud given
the history of the statute including the efforts of the United States to create processes
for transnational businesses in extremis.”); see id. (“The application of foreign
avoidance law in a Chapter 15 ancillary proceeding raises fewer choice of law concerns
as the court is not required to create a separate bankruptcy estate. It accepts the helpful
marriage of avoidance and distribution whether the proceeding is ancillary applying
foreign law or a full proceeding applying domestic law—a marriage that avoids the
more difficult depecage rules of conflict law presented by avoidance and distribution
decisions governed by different sources of law.”).
135. See supra Part II.B (explaining Condor’s rationale and noting that it is not
limited to insurance companies).
136. See supra Part I.E (explaining that § 1523 is the only governing provision
under Chapter 15 for avoidance actions and that it requires a non-US insolvency
representative to first commence a plenary proceeding under Chapter 7 or 11).
137. See 11 U.S.C. § 1523 (2006) (explaining that a non-US insolvency
representative may commence an avoidance action only within the framework of a
plenary proceeding under Chapter 7 or 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code).
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of law analysis. Nor does it even mention that Maxwell calls upon
US courts to do so.138
To explain this, Part III critiques Condor’s holding and
rationale. Part III.A examines Condor’s textual analysis of
Article 21, § 1521, Article 23 and § 1523. It also discusses the
structure and text of Chapter 15 and the role of statutory
interpretation and comity under this chapter of the US
Bankruptcy Code. Part III.B responds to Condor’s suggestion that
US courts unwaveringly defer to the avoidance law of a debtor’s
COMI. It does so by scrutinizing the § 304 cases cited by Condor.
Finally, Part III.C discusses why Condor’s characterization of
Chapter 15 is inconsistent with US policies and therefore with
the spirit of Chapter 15.
A. CHAPTER 15’s ORIGIN IN THE MODEL LAW DOES NOT
SUPPORT CONDOR’S TEXTUAL ANALYSIS
Chapter 15’s origin in the Model Law is exceptionally
relevant to understanding the purpose of each section under
Chapter 15.139 Article 21 of the Model Law looks to provide
enacting states with the opportunity to give foreign insolvency
representatives additional assistance under the local laws of the
enacting state.140 As such, § 1521 should be construed to permit
US courts to grant additional relief available under US law to
non-US insolvency representatives.141 While Congress explicitly
excluded avoidance actions under US law from § 1521,
Congress’ silence about avoidance under non-US law does not

138. Id.
139. See supra note 89–90 (showing that Chapter 15 is based upon the Model
Law).
140. See supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text (explaining the purpose of
Model Law Article 21); see also supra note 78 (citing Article 21 South Africa’s CrossBorder Insolvency Act, which shows that additional relief under its version of Model
Law Article 21 is limited to relief available under South African law and citing to an
Explanatory Memorandum on Australia’s Cross Border Insolvency Bill, which likewise
restricts all forms of additional relief in Australia’s version of Article 21 to Australian
law).
141. See supra notes 98–99 and accompanying text (explaining that pursuant to
§ 1521 US courts may provide additional assistance to non-US insolvency
representatives only under US law).
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mean that avoidance actions are permitted under non-US law
pursuant to § 1521.142
In any event, Article 21 of the Model Law and accordingly
Chapter 15’s § 1521 were not intended to govern avoidance
actions.143 In formulating the Model Law, a report of the
working group explains that Article 21 was not supposed to
address avoidance actions.144 Instead, the working group
determined to draft a separate article governing avoidance
actions.145 Model Law Article 23 (and, accordingly, § 1523 of
Chapter 15) alone governs avoidance actions.146 Section 1521’s
legislative history similarly explains that all avoidance actions are
governed by § 1523.147
Thus, § 1523 is the only controlling provision relating to
avoidance actions brought by a non-US representative following
recognition under Chapter 15.148 Section 1523’s legislative
history explains that this provision is not intended to resolve
choice of law determinations; as such, it encompasses avoidance
actions under both US and non-US law and requires all
avoidance actions to be brought through a plenary proceeding
under Chapter 7 or 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code.149
Since §§ 1521 and 1523 are clear, they do not invite
statutory interpretation. Congress explained in its legislative
history that although § 1507 preserves § 304 case law and the
142. See supra notes 98–99 and accompanying text (showing that Congress
excluded avoidance under US law from § 1521); supra notes 128–30 and accompanying
text (explaining Condor’s view that the silence in § 1521 about avoidance actions under
non-US law means that they are permitted under this section of Chapter 15).
143. See Rep. of the Working Group on Insolvency Law, supra note 66 (discussing
Model Law Article 21’s purpose).
144. See Rep. of the Working Group on Insolvency Law, supra note 66 (explaining
that avoidance actions were excluded from the general provision governing the effects
of recognition under the Model Law because of their sensitive nature and instead
would be dealt with by a separate article, which would become present Article 23).
145. See supra note 67 (explaining that UNCITRAL determined to adopt a
separate article to govern avoidance actions).
146. See supra notes 69–73 and 102–07 (explaining Article 23 of the Model Law
and § 1523 of Chapter 15).
147. See supra note 101 and accompanying text (discussing § 1521’s legislative
history, which states that all avoidance actions are governed by § 1523).
148. See supra notes 101–06 and accompanying text (addressing the purpose of
§ 1523).
149. See supra note 104 and accompanying text (explaining that § 1523 does not
“create or imply any legal rules with respect to the choice of applicable law . . . [and]
courts will determine . . . what national law may be applicable to such action.”‘).
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doctrine of comity for providing additional relief through
§ 1521, such case law and comity cannot be used to contradict
Chapter 15.150 Here, as § 1521’s purpose is to provide additional
relief only under US law, it is contradictory to use comity and
§ 1507 to alter § 1521’s function.151 It furthermore contradicts
Chapter 15 to use § 304 case law, in this case, Metzeler, to
rephrase § 1523’s clear rule.152 Chapter 15 does not codify any
particular US case.153 Chapter 15 is based on the Model Law—an
international product imported into the US’s legal system.154
The structure of Chapter 15 thus restricts a court’s discretion to
look to sections other than § 1523 to govern avoidance actions
and accordingly Condor’s textual analysis is unsuitable for
interpreting Chapter 15.155
B. US COURTS SHOULD NOT DEFER TO NON-US AVOIDANCE
LAW IN THE ABSENCE OF CHOICE OF LAW ANALYSIS
Condor also determined that an avoidance action governed
by the non-US law of the debtor’s COMI and brought in
connection with the recognition of a non-US main proceeding,
need not comply with the limits of § 1523, which requires a nonUS insolvency representative to first commence a plenary
proceeding under Chapter 7 or 11 of the US Bankruptcy
Code.156 This reading of § 1521, however, undermines the limits
imposed in § 1523.157 It also contradicts established § 304 case
law discussing choice of law in this context, namely Maxwell.

150. See supra note 91 (demonstrating that § 1507 preserves § 304 case law in the
context of providing additional relief, but only to the extent that this case law does not
contradict Chapter 15).
151. See supra notes 98–05 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose of
§§ 1521 and 1523).
152. See supra note 132 (explaining that Condor states that § 1523 codified
Metzeler’s ban on avoidance action under US law under § 304).
153. See supra note 4 (showing that in the introduction to Chapter 15, which
explains its purpose, there is no mention of codifying US case law).
154. See supra note 4 (explaining that Chapter 15 incorporates the Model Law
into US law); supra notes 89–90 (explaining that the United States adopted a version of
the Model Law).
155. See supra Part I.E (discussing § 304 and Chapter 15 and showing that their
structure is different).
156. See supra notes 128–30 and accompanying text (discussing Condor’s view of
§ 1521); supra notes 102–07 and accompanying text (explaining § 1523).
157. See supra notes 102–05 and accompanying text (discussing § 1523).
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Maxwell is the seminal US authority on choice of law in
avoidance actions in this context. Maxwell’s rule looks at where
the center of gravity of the fraudulent conveyance or preference
is, in order to determine which country’s law should govern in
an avoidance action commenced by a non-US representative.158
It requires US courts to employ US choice of law principles to
determine which law should apply and primarily to consider the
center of gravity of the transfer at issue to determine which
country’s law is implicated to the greatest extent.159 Condor did
not cite to Maxwell with respect to choice of law.160
Condor instead found that § 304 case law permitted
avoidance only under non-US law citing Metzeler, Tarricone, and
Petition of Kojima—lower court decisions that preceded
Maxwell.161 The rule in Metzeler is premised on a concern that
non-US insolvency representatives may benefit from the use of
US avoidance law.162 To address this concern, Metzeler created an
arbitrary bright line rule, prohibiting non-US insolvency
representatives from commencing avoidance actions under US
law via § 304.163
Although Tarricone cites Metzeler for the proposition that a
non-US representative’s avoidance actions are permissible, if at
all, under non-US avoidance law, it is not clear that Tarricone
followed Metzeler’s outright ban on avoidance under US law via §
304.164 Tarricone analyzed whether the transfer at issue was
158. See supra note 109 (explaining Maxwell’s choice of law rule).
159. See supra notes 109 and 132 (explaining that Maxwell holds that whether US
or non-US law should apply to an avoidance action is determined by a conflict of law
analysis; whereas Metzeler holds that avoidance should only be permitted under non-US
law).
160. See supra note 132 and accompanying text (showing that Condor made no
mention of Maxwell and instead looked to other § 304 case law for authority on choice
of law).
161. The Court also cited In re Aerovias Nacionales de Columbia S.A. Avianca
and In re Griffin—two cases that do not address avoidance actions. See supra note 132
(stating that Aerovias Nacionales de Columbia S.A. and Griffin do not address avoidance
and demonstrating that Metzeler, Tarricone, and Petition of Kojima were decided before
Maxwell).
162. See supra note 132 and accompanying text (discussing that Metzeler’s primary
concern was that a non-US insolvency representative may benefit from using US
avoidance law).
163. See supra note 132 (discussing Metzeler and its holding).
164. See supra note 132 (explaining that although Tarricone cited to Metzeler, it
may not have been fundamental to the court’s holding).
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avoidable under both US and non-US law, and ultimately
determined that the avoidance action was commenced too late
for recovery under either law.165 Thus, Tarricone seems to be
concerned with whether the transfer was voidable under both
US and non-US law before permitting avoidance under non-US
law.166 Likewise, while Petition of Kojima cites Metzeler for
authority to permit an avoidance action under non-US law, it
only allows the avoidance action to proceed after being satisfied
that the transfer is avoidable under both US and Japanese law.167
Thus, the analysis in Petition of Kojima also does not support
Metzeler’s rule that avoidance should only be permitted under
non-US law.168
In any event, Metzeler and Tarricone did not represent a
trend regarding choice of law in avoidance actions under §
304.169 Rather, as one scholar pointed out, the trend under § 304
case law was to permit avoidance actions either under US or
non-US law, depending on the result of a choice of law
analysis—the rule that was later articulated in Maxwell.170 US
courts did not historically, nor should they today, unwaveringly
defer to non-US avoidance law.171 Accordingly, Condor’s
suggestion that US courts should unwaveringly defer to non-US
avoidance law is incompatible with established US choice of law
jurisprudence.

165. See supra note 132 (describing Tarricone’s reasoning).
166. See supra note 132 (setting forth the analysis in Tarricone, which did not
center on Metzeler).
167. See supra note 132 (explaining that the court looked at the results of
permitting an avoidance action to go forward under US and Japanese law in order to
make its determination with respect to choice of law).
168. See supra note 132 (showing that because Petition of Kojima analyzed the
outcome of an avoidance action under two competing laws, it did not follow Metzeler’s
bright line rule that avoidance should only be permitted under non-US law).
169. See Westbrook, supra note 23, at 525 (concluding that the trend under § 304
case law was to permit the use of non-US avoidance law only if the transfer was
avoidable either under US or non-US law, at the discretion of a US court).
170. Id.
171. Id. (showing that historically under § 304 US courts did not unwaveringly
defer to non-US avoidance law).
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C. CONDOR IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE SPIRIT OF
CHAPTER 15
All avoidance actions brought in connection with a Chapter
15 case must be sought in a plenary proceeding under Chapter 7
or 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code and choice of law principles
applicable generally in US district courts control whether US or
non-US law govern that action.172 These rules were policy
choices made by Congress when adopting Chapter 15.173 Since
the Model Law permits an enacting state to adopt a cross border
insolvency law consistent with its domestic policies, Congress’
choices with respect to Chapter 15’s avoidance rules should be
preserved.
There are good reasons to limit avoidance actions to
Chapter 7 or 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code and to permit US
courts to determine whether US or non-US law should govern
these actions based on US choice of law principles.174 By
relegating avoidance actions to Chapter 7 or 11 of the US
Bankruptcy Code, Congress ensures that long-standing
safeguards and jurisprudence are preserved, even in the context
of an avoidance action brought in connection with a Chapter 15
case.175 Moreover, non-US insolvency law may not share the
same policy considerations as US insolvency law.176 The statute
of limitations for avoidance actions may differ in the law of the
debtor’s COMI and in the place where the avoidance action is
being commenced.177 While US avoidance law has a reach back
period of up to two years, St. Kitts & Nevis avoidance law seems
to permit avoidance actions for up to ten years.178
172. See supra notes 97–107 (explaining the avoidance rules under Chapter 15).
173. See supra note 89 (explaining that Chapter 15 incorporates US policies on
cross-border insolvency); supra note 68 and accompanying text (explaining that the
Model Law gives enacting states discretion in fashioning their cross-border insolvency
laws).
174. See supra notes 102–09 (discussing § 1523 and Maxwell’s choice of law
analysis).
175. See supra notes 100–03 and accompanying text (explaining that Congress
relegated all avoidance action brought in connection with a Chapter 15 case to Chapter
7 or 11 plenary proceedings).
176. See supra notes 31, 68 and accompanying text (explaining that insolvency
laws can vary between countries and that an enacting state’s version of the Model Law
incorporates its public policy choices).
177. See supra note 31 (showing that avoidance laws can vary between countries).
178. See supra note 31 (discussing US and St. Kitts avoidance laws).
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Non-US avoidance law may also be incompatible with US
insolvency policies for other reasons. For example, US
bankruptcy law does not permit insurance companies to file for
insolvency or commence an avoidance action under federal
law.179 Other countries may permit regulated entities to be
liquidated or restructured under the same laws as all other
business entities.180 Allowing an insurance company to bring an
avoidance action under non-US law through Chapter 15, may
vest a non-US insurance company with more freedom in
bankruptcy in the United States than is available to domestic
insurance companies.181
Unwavering deference to foreign law in cross border
insolvencies could thus undermine policy choices of the
enacting state—a result that is not espoused by the Model
Law.182 Indeed, the Model Law does not promote universalism—
where states that have enacted a version of the Model Law would
be required in all instances to apply the law governing the main
insolvency case.183 The Model Law embraces modified
universalism, where the tendency to defer to the law governing a
debtor’s COMI is not exclusive.184 Modified universalism’s
flexibility and likewise the Model Law’s framework provide
enacting states with broad discretion to fashion cross-border
insolvency laws consistent with their national policies.185 It is
precisely because the Model Law permits nations to maintain

179. See supra note 124 (explaining that under US law, both domestic and nonUS insurers must file for insolvency in state court under the supervision of state
insurance departments).
180. See supra Part II.B (discussing Condor’s rationale and showing that for
example, the court did not suggest the Condor Insurance had to go through a special
bankruptcy proceeding in St. Kitts because of its status as an insurance company).
181. See supra note 124 and accompanying text (showing that US insurers are
restricted to obtaining relief under state law).
182. See supra note 68 and accompanying text (explaining that enacting states
adopt the Model Law in a manner consistent with their national insolvency policies).
183. See supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text (discussing universalism); see
also supra note 60 and accompanying text (explaining that the Model Law leaves
matters of choice of law to enacting states).
184. See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text (discussing territorialism);
supra note 59 and accompanying text (explaining that the Model Law leaves matters of
choice of law to enacting states).
185. See supra note 68 (clarifying why Model Law articles have bracketed texts).
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their sovereign choices while fostering coordination, that it
provides a promising framework for cross-border insolvency.186
UNCITRAL provided enacting states with particularly great
latitude under Model Law Article 23, recognizing that nations
differ on whether foreign avoidance law should govern in an
action commenced domestically following recognition of a
foreign proceeding.187 In the same vein, the EU Regulation does
not require Member States to defer to foreign avoidance law,
although they are much more integrated economically and
politically than are nations implementing a version of the Model
Law.188 Instead, the EU Regulation calls upon Member States to
determine whether the transfer at issue is avoidable under both
the law of the debtor’s COMI and the law of the country where
the avoidance action is being commenced, before permitting
avoidance under foreign law.189 As such, there is furthermore no
precedent in the Model Law’s legislative history for enacting
states to unwaveringly defer to foreign avoidance law.190 Rather,
the spirit of the Model Law is for enacting states to incorporate
Article 23 as they deem fit.191 Whereas, Congress did just that—
made policy choices in enacting Chapter 15—those choices
should be preserved.
CONCLUSION
As transnational business becomes more pervasive, crossborder insolvencies will also increase. Thus, there are certain to
be future occasions when non-US insolvencies will petition for
Chapter 15 recognition and seek to commence an avoidance
action in the United States. To ensure that case law regarding
186. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (showing that each country has
different avoidance laws consistent with its national policies).
187. See supra notes 70–73 and accompanying text (explaining that Model Law
Article 23’s purpose is to preserve some form of avoidance relief for insolvency
representatives, but that it does not define any parameters of that relief or specify issues
regarding choice of law).
188. See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text (discussing when the law of
the debtor’s COMI is displaced in an EU avoidance action).
189. See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text (setting forth the EU
Regulation’s general choice of law rule in avoidance actions).
190. See supra notes 54, 89–90 (explaining that Chapter 15 is based on the Model
Law, which was based on the EU Regulation).
191. See supra note 68 and accompanying text (explaining that enacting states
incorporate the Model Law in a manner consistent with their national policies).
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cross-border avoidance actions develops in a manner consistent
with the intentions of Chapter 15, courts should not rely on
Condor.
Condor is inconsistent with Chapter 15 because it ignores
§ 1523’s requirement and misapprehends the purposes of
§ 1521. It also espouses a choice of law rule that is inconsistent
with established US choice of law jurisprudence. Going forward,
courts faced with Chapter 15 petitions seeking avoidance relief
should embrace § 1523 as the only governing provision for
avoidance actions and require that all such actions be brought
through a plenary proceeding under Chapter 7 or 11 of the US
Bankruptcy Code. At that time, courts should look to Maxwell in
their choice of law determinations.

